State-formation in Poland
1. Introduction
Factors such as feudalism, the military revolution and absolutism are considered as crucial for the process of state-building in Europe. Poland and its development in terms of state-building are different in some ways than most states emerging in the Western part of Europe. Therefore, the paper emphasises Poland’s uniqueness in state-building and argues how Poland was advanced in certain ways with having an extreme form of (nobles’) democracy and a constitution in an early age but, how paradoxically, its nobility and constitution were the factors making it weak and often paralysed.
Despite some differences, the common factors aforementioned are included in the examination of the emergence of Poland as a modern state. Calling Poland today a modern state, it is important to first define it. “The presence of a supreme authority, ruling over a defined territory, who is recognized as having power to make decisions in matters of government and is able to enforce such decisions and generally maintain order within the state” (Roberts, 2006). Applying this definition to the past times leads to the conclusion that this term was protean until reaching the definition we use today, keeping in mind that what used to be considered states were often lacking one or more factors that, combined, make a state that we know today.
The time frame of this paper starts with 966 and ends with 1918 in order to incorporate the crucial factors influencing the state-building in Poland. I am first writing a concise overview of Polish history which is followed by a section dealing with feudalism in Poland. As feudalism in Poland was different than elsewhere in Europe, the third section focuses on the emergence of the Republic of Poland-Lithuania in the 16th century. The fourth section explains why Military Revolution was impossible in Poland and compares absolutistic European states with a constitution-based Poland. The following section relates to the Age of Partitions and investigating which factors allowed it to take place. The seventh section explains how Poland still remained a ‘play ball’ of the great powers that had emerged after the Napoleonic wars. The conclusion explains how the factors included in this examination influenced Poland’s delayed emergence as a sovereign state that, as this paper argues, did not happen until 1918.
2. A Concise Overview of Polish History
The creation of the Polish state can be traced back to 966 A.D. and the baptism of Miezko I, the first ruler of a Polish state. With his baptism, Miezko I made a choice to follow the ‘western path’ of Christianity that highly influenced Poland throughout its entire history. Therefore, the year of 966 represents the introduction and subsequent spread of Christianity in Poland. After the ruling of Miezko I the Piast dynasty ruled Poland until the 14th century. During the Piast rule, the period of fragmentation, in which the kingdom was divided into several duchies, presented a severe threat to the unity of the Polish Kingdom.
Wladyslaw Lokietek was the one ruler who reunified the provinces and was crowned King of Poland (Rex Poloniae) in 1320. The last in the Piast dynasty, Casimir III (the Great) effectively reformed Poland by giving up Pomerania and Silesia in order to gain Rutenia and a few principalities that gave him significant authority and resulted in great internal peace. Many refer to the era of Casimir as the golden era of Polish Middle Ages. It was in his era when the University of Krakow was founded (1364).
In 1386, Jogaila, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, married queen Jadwiga of Poland and was baptized. As Wladyslaw II Jagiello, he became the king of Poland and marked the beginning of the Jagiellonian dynasty. The 16th century decline of the Jagiellonian dynasty resulted in the creation of an electoral monarchy, in which the assembly formed with the Polish nobility had the responsibility to elect a king.
In 1569, at the union of Lublin, a new union was confirmed- the Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów, Polskiego i Litewskiego, ‘The Commonwealth of the Two Nations, the Polish and Lithuanian’ (Lukowski & Zawadzki, 2001, p.64). The Commonwealth remained in its original form until the first partition of Poland in 1772, when Russia, Prussia and Austria have divided the Polish territory. Poland went through two more partitions in 1793 and 1795.
In the Second partition, 80 per cent of Poland’s territory went to Russia and the rest to Prussia. The third partition made Poland disappear from the map of Europe and its territory was once again divided among Russia, Prussia and Austria (Biskupski, 2000, p.18). Poland only re-emerged with its original territory at the end of the First World War.
3. Feudalism and Neo-Serfdom in Poland
The reason why it is not possible to firmly advocate feudalism in Poland is because its form was somewhat different than in most European countries.
A common opinion on this matter still does not exist even though many historians were interested in Polish feudalism over time (Skwarczyński, 1956, p.293), but everything depends on the definition of feudalism being used (Davies, 1996, p.315). Surely, some features of feudalism did exist in Poland and have impacted the social life of the country. Nevertheless, Norman Davies (Europe: A History, 1996, p.315) argues that feudalism in Eastern Europe lacked many of the key ingredients such as the strictly formed feudal pyramid composed of lords, vassals and fiefs. In Poland, “...the knights owned their land; there was no room or need for intermediaries between them and the king’’ (Skwarczyński, 1956, p.299). Any attempt to set up intermediate lords failed, as well as any attempt to give feudal titles to any higher official.
However, in the 15th century, feudalism in Poland was succeeded by neo-serfdom, or the second serfdom. The second serfdom also does not include all the general requirements to be an equivalent of the feudalism in the Middle Ages. Nonetheless, the second serfdom had a significant impact on the Polish agrarian economy, particularly through grain trade. In the beginning, the country men were obliged to pay rent for the field they were farming and were often not able to harvest enough grains to sell at the free market.
Their problem resulted with the country men working on fields of landlords in exchange for a secured salary and a small part of the landlord’s field on which they could harvest food for themselves. Consequently, the landlords were in a beneficial situation, having cheap manpower that was producing enough grain for them to sell on the international market of Europe. “It was clearly in the best interests of both lord and serf to work together in an atmosphere of mutual understanding” (Davies, 2005, p.215). Simultaneously, an inverse correlation between the demand for grain and the downfall of peasants’ rights was found. As Davies (2005) argues, “the later intensification of feudal services
was caused exclusively by the economic pressures of the Grain Trade” (p.215). The first limits on a peasant's right to leave the village were imposed in 1496 and in 1521, “the royal courts were closed to pleas where a peasant wished to appeal against his lord” (Davies, 2005, p.216).
During the 16th century, the working conditions for peasants in Poland were constantly worsening. However, a small part of the Polish peasantry kept their personal freedom and enjoyed some benefits similar to landlords’ by paying their way out of labour dues and hiring wage-workers. Nevertheless, peasant farmers were driven into different forms of dependence of their nobles.
The Polish countryside had a specific form of an estate, an institution dealing with serf labour and maximum production of grain- the Folkwark. It expanded in the benefit of the lords and the expense of the peasants, by buying lands and absorbing unused plots. “The folkwark system worked on the assumption that it gave the serf a minimum of land and security whilst maximizing the noble owner’s cash profit.” (Davies, 2005, p. 218-219)
At a certain point in the 16th century, the productivity of the folkwark stopped progressing. In addition, the decline of foreign demand resulted in a social and economic retreat. However, the serfs were being pushed harder to reduce the consequences of the crisis. With the decline of the Grain trade, economic life gradually worsened and many historians consider this to be a prelude to the Partitions of Poland.
4. The Treaty of Lublin (1569)
As a result of the disappearance of the Jagiellonian Dynasty, in 1569, the Treaty of Lublin joined the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in a united, but dual state with a separate set of laws and administrations. The Polish nobles and Lithuanian princes agreed upon being jointly governed by an elected King and a common Sejm (Davies, 2001, p.260). This was the emergence of the united Republic of Poland-Lithuania.
Future kings were elected by an assembly consisting of the entire nobility and crowned after swearing to maintain the Republic while assuring its principles: toleration, free royal elections, regular convocation of the Sejm, surveillance of royal policy, the declaration of war and foreign treaties. Furthermore, the king was to guarantee the nobility’s personal privileges, its right to approve taxes, and its Right of Resistance.
The newly established system after the Treaty of Lublin is often referred to as the Golden Liberty (Złota wolność szlachecka) or the Nobles’ Democracy because the szlachta (nobility) had equal rights and was reaping the same benefits and privileges, disregarding the differences in their economic statuses. The szlachta acquired sufficient privileges that no king could dare to dream about breaking its power.
Poland’s nobles conducted the legislature and the king, which is again a part of Poland’s uniqueness in comparison to other European countries. The differences between Poland’s constitution and absolutism in most European countries are examined in the following section.
5. The Military Revolution’s Impact on the Emergence of Absolutism in Contrast to Poland
5.1 Military Revolution in Europe
The military force in a feudal state consisted of many private armies, contrary to the infantry of imperial Rome. In the period of 1000 to 1400, heavy cavalry arose when large horses from Persia were imported and inventions like the horseshoe and the stirrup were introduced from Asia. A feudal army was an amalgamation of numerous retinues summoned by the king. Knights had the responsibility of acquiring military equipment and because it was expensive, not many were in arms in medieval armies.
In order to compare medieval times with the military revolution, it is also important to mention that the advantage in medieval warfare was defence. (Opello & Rosow, 1999, 2004, p.47-49)
In the period from 1300 to 1600, the advantage shifted to offense, particularly with the invention of the longbow, the pike and gunpowder. Subsequently, high-built castles were replaced by low forts; armies expanded and were becoming more advanced. Bigger armies were provided with trainings and discipline. “War itself became an object for the state, not just a series of battles fought by the king…” (Opello & Rosow, 1999, 2004, p.50)
With the growth of armies, feudalism in Europe was gradually turning to another form of rule- absolutism, “the rule by an all-powerful, all-embracing monarch who faces no checks or control on his power” (Opello & Rosow, 1999, 2004, p.76-77). Warfare was getting more expensive, so kings started to levy taxes and towns were steadily giving up their autonomy in order to be incorporated into the growing territorial state which was experiencing the merger of capital and state power in a unified state formation. (Opello & Rosow, 1999, 2004, p.51) 5.2 Military Revolution in Poland
While Europe responded to the Military Revolution by forming an absolutistic state, Poland had an extreme form of democracy and the Republic was under the mastery of the nobility. “The King of Poland was less of a limited monarch…and more of a manager under contract” (Davies, 2001, p.261). Another big problem for Poland was that it did not have a standing army. For this specific issue, Poland can be related to England that was also lacking a standing army, but had the benefit of its geographical position, which was one of Poland’s greater troubles.
Poland failed to provide an adequate reply to the armies of its enemies that were modernized and getting stronger with time. Military reforms of any kind and state centralization were not possible in Poland because of its constitutionalism, which was beneficial only for the nobility that formed 8-12 per cent of the society, contrary to other European countries where nobility was only holding 1-2 per cent of the society (Davies, 2001, p.261). “Constitutional paralysis paved the way for financial ruin, for military impotence and for foreign invasion.” (p.266)
By the 18th century, Poland had no allies in a transformed Europe surrounding it. Furthermore, it did not have any forms of natural defence or a modern army. Its enemies formed a cooperative coalition of absolutism that was only coherent in opportunities like partitioning a defenceless neighbour like Poland.
The outcome of Poland’s weakness was expected as it had little chance for survival. Its independence was lost and its land divided among great powers that had learned their lesson of the military revolution- Austria, Russia and Prussia. (Downing, 1993. p. 447) “These three powers were destined to dominate Eastern Europe in the following century and…to partition the Republic between them” (Davies, 2001, p.267). The consequences Poland had to endure during the 18th century are addressed next.
6. The Age of Partitions
18th century Poland was smaller, weaker and poorer than ever and the final epoch of old Poland was starting to take place. The weakness of the Saxon monarchs allowed them to witness Poland’s gradual slump under the influence of Russia while it was still officially independent. Not surprisingly, Poland became the weakest large state in Europe, a state paralysed by its constitution, still ruined by the 17th century wars with Sweden and with a disadvantageous position.
Subsequently, the gentry’s awareness of a need for a change was growing, but not fully. Thus, the reform movements taking place in the late 18th century were not supported by the most powerful nobles, who were still choosing Poland’s decentralization over reforms of any kind. Needless to say, the highest nobles were not ready to give up the power and high positions that they held in a decentralized Poland. Nevertheless, a national protest opposing Russian influence did occur in 1768 under the leadership of Kazimierz Pułaski at the Confederation of Bar.
Although the protest crumbled under Russian forces, it gave Frederick II of Prussia reasons to fear that Poland could take over control. He suggested a despoilment of Poland to the empress of Russia- Catharina II, which resulted with the first Polish partition in 1772. Eventually, Austria was included and the three powers divided Poland among themselves. “The treaties of partition were signed in 1772. The Polish King and Diet, duly chastened, were persuaded to put them into effect in 1773” (Davies, 2001, p.271)
After the first partition, Poland’s reformers attempted to gain back control and emancipate. In 1788, they acquired enough power to regulate the four-year Sejm which had to authorize a set of changes. The abolition of the liberum veto and the rejection of the elective monarchy were the pinnacles of the reform movement, as well as the May Third Constitution from 1791, Europe’s first written constitution. In words of Lukowski and Zawadzki (2001), Poland’s constitution was “a curious hybrid of royal hopes for a more vigorous monarchy and a more effective parliament, with checks and balances to curb any despotic tendencies” (p.100).
As impressive as the new constitution was, it troubled Prussia and Russia enough for them to plan yet another partition without Austria. In 1793, the king had surrendered, the Sejm was forced to nullify the Constitution and approve the Second Partition of Poland (Davies, 2001, p.273). What was left of Poland after a colossal amputation of its territory was not sufficient for an independent existence. “Polish territorial losses in this partition were larger than the size of today’s Italy” (Biskupski, 2000, p.18).
With an attempt of a peaceful Reform leading to another partition, in 1794, a self-proclaimed naczelnik (national leader), Tadeusz Kościuszko initiated a national upheaval to repair Poland’s situation. He gathered an army of the serfs he had freed for wanting to join, but was lacking resources and time to train them. With his newly-formed army, he had a moment of glory in the battle of Racławice, but was soon defeated by the Russian army. General Suvorov took over Warsaw that had surrendered. “On 25 November 1795, Stanisław August Poniatowski signed an act of abdication” (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2001, p.105).
Poland was once again divided among Russia, Prussia and Austria and this time, The Republic of Poland-Lithuania had ceased to exist. “On 12 January 1796, a tripartite convention between Russia, Austria and Prussia in St Petersburg insisted on ‘the need to abolish everything which can recall the memory of the existence of the kingdom of Poland’ ” (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2001, p.105).
The territory of old Poland remained divided under external authority until the end of the First World War. Therefore, Poland did not emerge as a great power by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Moreover, it did not emerge as a sovereign state until the 20th century.
7. The Congress of Vienna (1815)
7.1 Pre-Congress Poland
Before being defeated, Napoleon had shared enemies with Poland and was therefore, accepted and greeted by many Poles who trusted his ability to “bring low the Commonwealth’s murderers and restore the Polish state” (Biskupski, 2000, p.23). Despite of the support the Poles provided to Napoleon, he did not consider the reconstruction of Poland a crucial part of his strategy.
He did, however, create the Duchy of Warsaw (1807) - a small, pseudo-Poland. “It had its own Polish administration, its own parliamentary Constitution, its own army under Poniatowski, and it received the Napoleonic Code; but it was also subjected to an absentee Duke (the King of Saxony), who was entirely answerable to French orders...” (Davies, 2001, p.141).
The Duchy of Warsaw existed until 1815, Napoleon’s defeat and the Congress of Vienna.
7.2 Post-Congress Poland
All the great powers at the Congress of Vienna were hoping to fulfil their interests after the negotiations. The chances of having a country’s wishes granted were highly dependent on its part in the anti-Napoleonic wars. Clearly, Russia prioritized Poland’s annexation. Despite Russia’s strong negotiation position because of defeating Napoleon, Tsar Alexander did not manage to get all of Poland. He did, however, get to keep a bigger part of it, including Warsaw but it was also decided that he “was to rule over a separate Polish kingdom endowed with a modern, liberal constitution” (Davies, 2001, p.142).
The western part of the old Republic stayed under the rule of Prussia, constructed as the Grand Duchy of Posen. Austria kept on ruling over the part of Galicia and Cracow became a sovereign Republic. The most important innovation of the Congress of Vienna regarding Poland was the creation of the Congress Kingdom of Poland. It was smaller than the Duchy of Warsaw, but had a particular amount of autonomy based on a constitution, an autonomous army and a parliament. The Russian Tsar was the ruler of the Congress Kingdom and was also perceived as the king of Poland. “This curiosity, far from being a reborn Poland, but certainly not just a piece of Russia, was doomed from its inception, whatever the motivation for its creation” (Biskupski, 2000, p.25).
The Congress Kingdom was denied its sovereignty and reorganized in 1831. Furthermore, the constitution was nullified in 1832, the Republic of Cracow absorbed by
Austrian Galicia in 1846 and the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Posen abolished in 1848 (Davies, 2001, p.143).
8. Conclusion
After the examination of crucial factors in the state-building processes, it is now clear that Poland followed a different path than other European countries. Its elective monarchy system took away the king’s sovereignty and handed it to the nobility that was overly focused on their own interests, separate from the well-being of the Commonwealth.
It is possible to firmly argue the nobility’s leading role in weakening Poland throughout its history, particularly when the wealthiest nobles readily defied any form of state development in the Age of Partitions, leaving the Commonwealth fragile and easy to attack by its neighbour states, which eventually ruined it completely.
Despite of its progressive governing, Poland was falling back on building a centralized and sovereign state and caused its enemies to first see it as a threat and later an easy target. Furthermore, its opponents did not restrain from using force to fulfil their interests and Poland, which did not benefit from the Military Revolution, was left without any means to fight back.
Because of its unsafe geographical position, Poland could not afford lacking a standing army when its neighbours were building theirs, but the nobility did not focus on such matters and led Poland to destruction from which it had only recovered in 1918, with the end of the First World War.
9. Bibliography (Reference list)
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